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AVOIDANCE OF DISCLAIMER BY ACTION FOR
FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION
EUGENE H. SAGE
The recent Washington Supreme Court decision in the case of
Nyquist v. Foster1 dealt with the troublesome problem of a chattel
vendee's right to rescind upon proof of the vendor's fraudulent mis-
representation in a sales situation where the contract of sale contains
a disclaimer clause. The purpose of the disclaimer clause is to prevent
a suit by the purchaser upon a theory of either express or implied
warranty. The common practice of inserting such a clause in a con-
tract of sale makes any ruling upon its effective scope in limiting a
vendee's possible right of action a matter of importance to lawyers
and businessmen.
A disclaimer clause limiting the liability of the vendor is well-rooted
in the freedom-of-contract concept. If a vendee desires to purchase a
chattel, and in so doing agrees to limit his possible right of action arising
out of the sale, he is free to do so. Most controversies involving an
alleged breach of warranty where the vendor has included a disclaimer
clause in the agreement of sale turn, not upon the fairness of the pro-
vision, but rather upon the issue of whether the disclaimer was broad
enough in scope to negative any and all express or implied warranties.Effective as a disclaimer clause may be to limit a contract right of
action, it will not bar actions sounding in tort.2 The underlying prin-
ciple behind this rule might well be one of public policy. Courts have
been reluctant to allow a party to a contract to completely disclaim all
responsibility under any theory which the other party might advance.
Consequently it has long been the rule that although a vendor could
bar a warranty action by disclaimer, an action based upon a fraudulent
misrepresentation could not be so disclaimed
'44 Wn.2d 45, 268 P.2d 442 (1954).
-Schroeder v. Hotel Commercial Co., 84 Wash. 685, 147 Pac. 417 (1915) ; Wells v.
Walker, 109 Wash. 332, 186 Pac. 857 (1920).
a Wells v. Walker, supra, note 2. The Wells case involved a disclaimer broad enough
to cover all warranties whether express or implied. Where the disclaimer clause is so
broad as to cover all warranties, a parol evidence problem is presented. A disclaimer
clause which does not have sufficient scope to negate all warranties will have no effect
upon the question of whether parol evidence is admissable to show a warranty not
included within the disclaimer, but if the disclaimer clause includes all warranties,
then evidence of a warranty other than those contained in the writing would not be
admissable. Note, however, that if fraud can be shown, no provision of the contract
can bar the admission of evidence of a fraudulent misrepresentation. VOLD SALES §
151 (1931).
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The rule of nondisclaimer of fraud has given rise to a good number
of difficult cases. At early common law when scienter was an indis-
pensible element in a fraud action, the question was not so perplexing.
If the vendee could not show that the vendor possessed a fraudulent
intent at the time of sale, then his remedy must be founded upon a
breach of warranty theory. If the vendor had taken the precaution of
disclaiming liability, the vendee was in a rather difficult position.
Once the element of scienter disappeared as an element of fraud, the
requirements for an action based upon a breach of warranty, and the
requirements for an action based upon a fraudulent misrepresentation
began to merge. As the disclaimer clause could not affect an action for
fraudulent misrepresentation, its value as a limiting factor upon the
liability of a vendor for statements made to a vendee diminished.
Scienter is not an element in a fraud action in the State of Washing-
ton." The elements which must be shown are: a representation of an-
existing fact; its falsity; its materiality; the speaker's knowledge of
its falsity or ignorance of its truth; intent that it should be acted upon
by the person to whom it was made; the latter's reliance on the truth
of the representation; his right to rely on it; and his consequent dam-
age.5 Each of these elements must be proved with clear and cogent
proof,' and the existence of fraud will never be presumed.'
There appears to be a rather close parallel between the requirements
for a fraudulent misrepresentation and the requirements of an express
warranty. Section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act 8 defines an express
warranty as: "Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller
relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of
such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods,
and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon. No affirmation
of the value of the goods, nor any statement purporting to be a state-
ment of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a warranty."
A comparison of the quoted section of the Uniform Sales Act with
the requirements of a fraud action in the State of Washington would
indicate that in many situations the representations of the seller would
4 Pratt v. Thompson, 133 Wash. 218, 233 Pac. 637 (1925) ; McDaniel v. Crabtree,
143 Wash. 168, 254 Pac. 1091 (1927).
5 Graft v. Geisel, 39 Wn.2d 131, 234 P.2d 884 (1951) ; Andrews v. Standard.Lumber
Co., 2 Wn.2d 294, 97 P.2d 1062 (1940).
6 Tecklenburg v. Washington Gas Co., 40 Wn.2d 141, 241 P.2d 1172 (1952) ; Marion
v. Grand Coulee Dam Hotel, 35 Wn.2d 589, 214 P.2d 204 (1950).
7 Melton v. United Retail Merchants, 24 Wn.2d 145, 163 P.2d 619 (1945) ; Schanno
v. Pangle, 19 Wn.2d 539, 143 P.2d 540 (1943).
8 RCW 63.04.
1955]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
present the buyer with an election as to which remedy to pursue. Obvi-
ously, if a disclaimer clause is in the contract, the remedy would be in
an action for fraud. But not all statements which will give rise to a
warranty action will support an action for fraud.' This raises the
problem of whether a given representation will merely give rise to a
warranty which can be disclaimed, or whether it will give rise to a
misrepresentation which cannot.
It might appear that it is the element of intent which would differen-
tiate between warranty and misrepresentation. Such a distinction is
doubtful in view of the doctrine of "constructive fraud."' The intent
required in fraud is that the speaker have knowledge of the falsity of
the representation, or ignorance of its truth." It is the "ignorance of
its truth" provision that prompted the court in the case of Thompson v.
Huston" to remark: "Untrue statements amount to constructive fraud,
although made in entire good faith."'
The apparent lack of distinction in the intent element between a
warranty and misrepresentation has had at least two effects in the
sale situation. It first deprives the vendor of a defense based upon
good faith where the vendee's action is for fraud. It also encourages
the vendee to avoid the operation of a disclaimer clause by bringing
his action in tort.
When an action for rescission due to fraud has been brought by the
vendee, the vendor in the majority of cases has based his defense upon
the theory that his statements were not representations at all, but were
merely statements of opinion.' It might be noted that this is also one
of the defenses which the vendor could rely upon if the action were
based upon breach of warranty."
The "statement of opinion" versus "representation of an existing
fact" distinction is far from clear. In the case of Western Farquhar
Machinery Co. v. Pierce,"0 the court held that an oral statement by the
vendor that a given engine would develop a certain horsepower was an
oral representation barred by the insertion in the contract of a dis-
9 Western Farquhar Machinery Co. v. Pierce, 108 Wash. 621, 185 Pac. 570 (1919).
10 Thompson v. Huston, 17 Wn.2d 457, 135 P.2d 834 (1943).
11 Grant v. Huschke, 74 Wash. 257, 133 Pac. 447 (1913).
12 Supra, note 10.
3Accord, Starwich v. Ernst, 100 Wash. 198, at 201, 170 Pac. 584, at 585 (1918).
"True, there was no showing that the representation was wilfully false or made with
intent to deceive, but it is not the rule in this jurisdiction that ... the representation
must be wilfully made with intent to deceive in order tor give rise to liability."
14 See Getty v. Jett Ross Mines, 23 Wn.2d 45, 159 P.2d 379 (1945).
15 RCW 63.04.130.
16 Supra, note 9.
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claimer clause. In that case, the vendee did not allege fraud on the
part of the vendor. In the later case of Peoples Bank and Trust Co. v..
L. Romano Engineering Co.,," the vendee tried a different tack when
faced with a disclaimer, and prevailed by alleging that a statement by
the vendor that a diesel engine would develop more horsepower than a
gasoline engine was a fraudulent misrepresentation. Whether the
vendee in the Western Machinery case could have prevailed upon a
theory of fraud is of course a moot question, but viewed in retrospect,
the facts would have merited its allegation.
The decision in the Peoples Bank and Trust case was destined to
have a considerable impact upon the law of misrepresentation in the
State of Washington. A previous case of Webster v. L. Romano En-
gineering Co. 8 had rejected an argument of fraud based upon a state-
ment that the vendor's road grader would operate successfully in wet
earth and gravel. The court held that the statement was merely one of
opinion, and not the statement of an existing fact. The court in the
Peoples Bank and Trust case was divided, and the report contains three
opinions. The majority distinguished the Webster case on the grounds
that the statement by the vendor in that case was a matter of opinion.
A concurring opinion applauded the majority for not following the
Webster case, but maintained that it should have been expressly over-
ruled. The dissent claimed that the Webster decision should have been
followed, and that the plaintiff's action for misrepresentation should
have been dismissed! These three opinions serve to illustrate the lack
of unanimity which has marked the history of the problem.
In the most recent decision involving the issue of representation of
fact or statement of opinion, the court was forced to take another look
at both the Webster and Peoples Bank and Trust decisions. In the
case of Nyquist v. Foster,"9 the vendor assured the vendee that the
masonite walls of a trailer would not warp. This representation was
not placed in the contract of sale in the form of a warranty. The con-
tract did contain a sweeping disclaimer clause which rendered all but
impossible a recission based upon an express or implied warranty
theory. Shortly after purchase, the walls of the trailer began to warp.
The vendee returned the trailer and demanded the return of the pay-
ments which he had made. Upon the refusal of the vendor to take back
the trailer and return the payments, the vendee brought suit for fraud.
17188 Wash. 290, 62 P.2d 445 (1936).
18178 Wash. 118, 34 P.2d 428 (1934).
19 Supra, note 1.
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The vendee claimed that the Nyquist facts fell within the rule of the
Peoples Bank and Trust case, while the vendor urged that the rule of
the Webster case should be applied. The distinction which the court
drew between the two cases formed the crux of the decision. The court
first pointed out that in the Webster case, the vendor had stated that
the chattel would be satisfactory for a particular purpose of the vendee,
and that this element of particular purpose was lacking in both the
Peoples Bank and Trust and the Nyquist case. In answer to the argu-
ment of the vendee that the statement that the trailer walls would not
warp related to a future event, the court stated that what the vendor
was in fact saying was that at the time of the statement, the walls of
the trailer possessed a then existing capacity to successfully resist
moisture and other climatic conditions which tend to cause warping.
By this line of reasoning, a misrepresentation of a deject which inhered
in the chattel at the time that the statement was made was a misrepre-
sentation of an existing fact, and was not a matter of opinion. Could it
not be argued that in the Webster case the capacity of the road grader
to perform in wet earth and gravel inhered in the chattel at the time
that the vendor's statement was made? No, said the court, for that was
a representation that the chattel would be satisfactory for a particular
purpose of the vendee, and hence the rule was inapplicable. It is some-
what interesting to note in connection with the court's distinction of
the Webster case that the clearest statement of the "inherent quality"
rule, which was relied upon by the court in the Nyquist case, that can
be found in any of the early cases is contained in the dissenting opinion
to the Webster case itself 120
The statement of opinion or representation of existing fact criterion
announced in the Nyquist case is that if the statement concerned a
quality which inhered in the chattel at the time that the statement was
made, then this is a representation of an existing fact, unless such repre-
sentation related to the ability of the chattel to serve a particular pur-
pose of the vendee. The court then grafted another exception onto the
rule. If the representation depended for satisfaction upon the per-
formance of a future act, or the occurance of a future event, the
20 Supra, note 18 at 123, 34 P.2d at 431. "... the majority opinion is based upon the
false premise that there was no misrepresentation as to an existing fact. The existing
fact alleged was that the grader was capable, adequate and sufficient for operating in
hard and wet earth and gravel .... That was not a mere promise or representation of
what the promissor would do in the future, but what its implement could and would
do in the present.'
[FEB.
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representation was merely one of opinion, and would not give rise to
an action for fraud."
The statement of the court in the Nyquist case is probably the
clearest definition of what the court considers a representation of an
existing fact that can be found in any decision rendered by the Wash-
ington Supreme Court. The rule that a statement concerning a quality
which inhered in the chattel at the time that the statement was made
is a representation of an existing fact unless it relates to a particular
use of the chattel by the vendee, or unless the satisfaction of the thing
represented depends upon the performance of a future act or occur-
rence of a future event serves to distinguish the Peoples Bank and
Trust case from the Webster case.
The impact of the announced rule upon the common law of the State
of Washington is somewhat difficult to gauge. This is due chiefly to a
lack of expression in the earlier cases as to just what constitutes a
statement of fact or a statement of opinion. A reading of the earlier
cases would seem to indicate that several vendees could have prevailed
upon a theory of fraud, although they lost on a breach of warranty
theory.22 This fact would lead to the belief that the rule of the
Nyquist case does represent somewhat of an innovation in the law of
fraud in this state. Henceforth vendors should not place too much
reliance upon the defense that their statements were merely opinion.
Certainly it will be rather an unusual'defect which does not inhere in
the chattel at the time that the representation was made. To what
extent, if any, the immunity of vendors for "sales puffing" has been
21 An example of this exception can be found in the case of Andrews v. Standard
Lumber Co., 2 Wn2d 294, 97 P2d 1062 (1940). In that case the vendor represented
that by following a home construction plan contract the vendee could construct a
house for a stated price. This could not give rise to an action for misrepresentation
due to the fact that the satisfaction of the thing represented depended upon the future
performance of the Lumber Company and the building contractor.
22 In Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P2d 409 (1932), the vendor
represented that the windshield on the chattel was shatterproof. The vendee brought
an action for damages resulting from the shattering of the windshield. The theory of
the vendee's action, or rather the grounds upon which he prevailed against the manu-
facturer are not too clear. The retail dealer was joined with the manufacturer, and
the court described the action as one for breach of warranty. Recovery was allowed
against the manufacturer although there clearly was no privity of contract. The action
against the retailer was dismissed upon the basis of a disclaimer clause. There was
ample evidence of representations made to the vendee by both the manufacturer and
the retailer to support a fraud action under the Nyquist rule. It would appear that
the vendee might have been successful against the retail dealer had he chosen to bring
the action for fraud, affirm the contract and sue for damages. In Winston Motor
Carriage v. Blomberg, 84 Wash. 451, 147 Pac. 21 (1915), the vendee defended in-an
action for replevin of an automobile by relying upon a verbal warranty of the vendor
that defective parts would be replaced. The vendee was defeated by the presence of an
integration clause in the contract. No allegation of fraud was made, but certainly the
defects in the automobile inhered in the chattel at the time of sale.
1955]
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reduced remains to be determined by subsequent decisions. As a prac-
tical lesson, the case would indicate that in any situation where the
vendee is confronted with the problem of escaping the action of a dis-
claimer clause, and wishes to sue for recission, an allegation of fraudu-
lent misrepresentation should be included in the pleadings.
Another problem of the Nyquist case involves the reason behind the
statement of the court that a representation by the vendor as to the
fitness of the chattel for a particular use of the vendee cannot be a
representation of an existing fact. This would seem to indicate that
there is one class of representations which can be completely disclaimed
to bar a warranty action, and which will not give rise to a suit for
fraudulent misrepresentation. The implied or express warranty of fit-
ness for use demands as one of its elements that the vendee make
known to the vendor the particular purpose or use for which the chattel
is being purchased.23 If the vendee does make such purpose known to
the vendor, and if the sales agreement contains a disclaimer clause,
then the vendee cannot recover under either a theory of breach of war-
ranty or a theory of misrepresentation. Just why a vendor cannot make
a representation of an existing fact when the statement concerns a
particular use to which the chattel will be put is not clear. If the chattel
had the quality of either being fit or not fit for the purpose of the
vendee, this quality in all probability inhered in the chattel at the time
of sale. It might appear that the court did not care to disturb the
Webster case, so built the rule around it. The persuasiveness of the
Webster dissent seems enhanced, not diminished, in light of the rule of
the Nyquist decision.24 Of course in a great many sales situations the
problem of the particular use to which the chattel will be put by the
vendee will not arise due to the fact that the chattel is only intended
for use in connection with one particular purpose.
The facts of the Nyquist case appear to present the middleground
between two oft-conflicting and well-established principles of law. On
the one hand is the policy of freedom of contract. On the other is the
23 RCW 63.04.160 (1).
24 In Wells v. Walker, supra, note 3, the court allowed the vendee to rescind for
fraud. The alleged misrepresentation was that a truck was capable of carrying a
three-ton load over "ordinary" roads. Would this be a "particular use" to which the
chattel would be put? It is a trifle difficult to distinguish a representation that a truck
would perform capably under ordinary conditions from a representation that a road
grader would perform capably under stated adverse conditions, yet the Wells and the
Webster cases reach opposite results. One possible distinction, although not one
advanced by the court, is that a vendor should be held to know what his chattel will
do under ordinary conditions, but must speculate as to how it would operate under
abnormal or adverse conditions.
[FEB.
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public policy of forcing the vendor to stand behind his goods. Perhaps
the comparative ease with which the modem courts find fraudulent
misrepresentation can best be explained as an adjunct of the general
shift in legal philosophy away from the older caveat emptor principle."
The absence of a fraud allegation in the earlier cases involving actions
arising from the sale of defective chattels might well be evidence of
the reception which such allegations were at that time receiving at the
hands of the court. Faced in the Nyquzst case with the problem of
making the election between freedom of contract and public policy, the
'Washington Supreme Court chose public policy, and thereby placed
itself in line with the current legal thought.
25 "t the more modern authorities have gradually recognized that it is not com-
mercially expedient to impose upon the seller the burden of making good his representa-
tions about the goods. Accordingly the risk of the accuracy of the seller's state-
ments about the goods is not thrown upon the seller who uses the language at his
peril as an inducement to the buyer to buy, rather than the party who property relied
thereon. In this respect caveat emptor, let the buyer beware, has given rise to caveat
vendor, let the seller beware." VoLD SALEs § 142 at 444 (1931). It should be noted
that in the above quotation the author was speaking of warranties, not misrepresenta-
tions, but it is submitted that the same legal thought which prompted the courts to
relax the rules of warranty has also prompted them to look with increasing favor
upon an action for fraudulent misrepresentation.
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